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Introduction 
Over the last decade, numerous scholars and commentators have 
labeled the Roberts Court as a “pro-business” Court.1 There are various 
reasons why the label seemed to stick, such as the success rate of the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the Court as well as anecdotal evidence 
based on particular cases.2 In addition, systematic empirical evidence 
suggests that the Roberts Court has decided in favor of business liti-
gants more frequently than under previous Chief Justices going back to 
 
† J. Mitchell Pickerill is Professor of Political Science and Associate Faculty 
of Law at Northern Illinois University. 
†† Cornell W. Clayton is the Thomas S. Foley Distinguished Professor of Gov-
ernment and the Director of the Thomas S. Foley Institute of Public Policy 
and Public Service at Washington State University. 
1. E.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. Times Mag. (Mar. 16, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html [https:// 
perma.cc/RBF9-X9CV]; see also infra Part I.A (describing the emergence of 
the Roberts Court’s pro-business reputation). 
2. E.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts 
.html [https://perma.cc/L8ZX-F8BC] (describing the Roberts Court as an 
activist court that favors business interests); see also infra Part I.A. 
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at least the 1940s.3 Despite the development of this conventional wis-
dom, some commentators question how pro-business the Court really 
is.4 Various legal scholars have argued that when one actually analyzes 
the Court’s doctrine, the impact for big business appears far less favor-
able.5 Although we agree that close attention should be paid to doctrine 
and even different issue areas involving business and economics, we ul-
timately take a different approach. We draw from the “political regi-
mes” (or “regime politics”) in the political science literature on the 
Court to provide a more robust understanding of how it gradually be-
came more business-friendly over time as a result of the influence of 
conservative politics, beginning long before John Roberts was installed 
as the seventeenth Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. However, 
while the Court has been influenced by the predominant values of a 
“New Right Regime,” it also reflects another key characteristic of the 
regime—division and polarization.6 To show how these changes have 
occurred over time, we analyze cases based on the issue areas of eco-
nomic regulation and labor union activity, as opposed to whether a 
business entity won or lost as a party to the case. Although this 
approach cannot tell us the doctrinal effects of the Court’s decisions, it 
at least provides a general picture of whether the Court favors govern-
ment regulation of the economy and unions on the one hand, and busi-
nesses and employers on the other. 
In Part I, we review the assessments of the Roberts Court’s orien-
tation toward business to provide some context for the debate. First, 
we discuss the emergence of the conventional wisdom that the Roberts 
Court is pro-business, and then we briefly review the arguments of those 
who are skeptical of those claims. In Part II, we summarize the political 
regimes approach for understanding Supreme Court decisions and legal 
change in the Court. We also discuss how the politics of a “New Right 
Regime” have been influenced by conservativism, but at the same time 
are characterized by a long period of divided government and polari-
zation. In Part III, we analyze data from the Supreme Court’s decisions 
involving economic regulation and union activity from 1946 through 
the end of the 2015 term of the Supreme Court. We conclude that since 
the beginning of the Burger Court, the Court has increasingly voted in 
 
3. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares 
in the Supreme Court, 97 U. Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1471 (2013). 
4. E.g., Robin S. Conrad, The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business 
Bias, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 997, 1000 (2009) (arguing that favorable 
decisions for businesses under the Roberts Court are the product of “im-
partiality and fairness,” not a bias toward businesses); see also infra Part I.B. 
(discussing detractors from the majority opinion that the Roberts Court is 
pro-business). 
5. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
6. For our discussion on the effects of the “New Right Regime” on the Supreme 
Court, see infra Part II.A. 
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what might be called the “conservative” direction—i.e., against econo-
mic regulations and labor. Additionally, the Court frequently divides 
along both ideological and partisan lines in these cases, reflecting the 
regime in which is it situated. 
I. Assessments of the Roberts Court as “Pro-Business” 
In this Part we briefly summarize the emergence of a new con-
ventional wisdom about the Court—namely, that it is decidedly pro-
business. Just a few years after John Roberts assumed the Chief Jus-
ticeship, journalists and scholars were writing about what seemed to be 
a new pro-business disposition in the Court. Part I begins by reviewing 
some of those claims. In the last section of this Part, we consider some 
of the critics or skeptics of those claims. 
A. The Emergence of a Conventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court is 
Decidedly Pro-Business 
By now, the Roberts Court’s reputation as a pro-business Court 
has become something like the conventional wisdom for Supreme Court 
scholars and commentators. In 2008, Jeffrey Rosen wrote an article 
titled Supreme Court, Inc. in New York Times Magazine.7 Rosen ar-
gued that, whereas the Court had embraced a form of “economic popu-
lism” throughout most the latter half of the twentieth century, by the 
2000s it had transformed into a decidedly pro-business venue.8  
A generation ago, progressive and consumer groups petitioning the 
court could count on favorable majority opinions written by justices 
who viewed big business with skepticism—or even outright prejudice. 
The economic populist William O. Douglas, a former New Deal crusader 
who served on the court from 1939 to 1975, once unapologetically an-
nounced that he was “ready to bend the law in favor of the environment 
and against the corporations.”9 
Today, however, as Rosen pointed out, “there are no economic pop-
ulists on the court, even on the liberal wing.”10 In addition to quoting 
pro-business statements from members of the so-called liberal wing of 
the Roberts Court at the time, Rosen noted that, when compared to 
prior years, the proportion of cases involving business interests was up 
about ten percent during the early years of the Roberts Court.11 Rosen 
 
7. Rosen, supra note 1. 
8. See id. (arguing that while, historically, the Supreme Court “viewed big bus-
iness with skepticism,” the birth of the Roberts Court in 2005 created a 
Court that was “more receptive to business concerns”). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
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also highlighted several cases involving antitrust law, corporate mer-
gers, punitive damages, and product liability in which the interests of 
big business seemed to be faring well in the Court.12 
These cases didn’t seem to split the Roberts Court along conven-
tional ideological lines. In a 2009 law review article, Rosen reported 
that, when he asked Justice Stephen Breyer about the Court’s pro-
business orientation, “he did acknowledge that there might be a differ-
ence between constitutional cases, where Justices have strong precon-
ceptions and philosophical commitments, and more technical, statutory 
cases, where they are more open-minded and amendable to argument.”13 
Finally, Rosen explained the pro-business shift as a function of a 
decades-long effort by conservative and business groups to counter the 
effects of consumer groups and public interest litigation groups like 
Public Citizen.14 In particular, he credited the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce’s lobbying efforts and the National Chamber Litigation Center, 
established in 1977, for advocating business interests in state and fed-
eral courts.15 Various examples and statistics indicated that through 
filing amicus briefs on behalf of business interests, the Chamber was 
successful both in persuading the Court to grant certiorari and on the 
merits in particular cases. 
Although Rosen’s article garnered much attention, he was not the 
only journalist or commentator claiming the Court was “pro-
business.”16 For example, writing for Bloomberg Business, Michael Orey 
declared that the Roberts Court was “open for business.”17 And in an 
article in the Wall Street Journal, Brent Kendall explained that the 
Supreme Court is “making it easier for companies to defend themselves 
 
12. See id. (emphasizing the important consequences of “shareholder suits, anti-
trust challenges to corporate mergers, patent disputes and efforts to reduce 
punitive-damage awards and prevent product-liability suits”). 
13. Jeffrey Rosen, Santa Clara Law Review Symposium: Big Business and the 
Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 929, 933 (2009). 
14. Rosen, supra note 1. 
15. Id. 
16. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 2 (discussing the role of the Chamber of Com-
merce and its success in state and federal courts); Robert Barnes & Carrie 
Johnson, Pro-Business Decision Hews to Pattern of Roberts Court, Wash. 
Post (June 22, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/06/21/AR2007062100803.html [https://perma.cc/R76J-9XJP] 
(finding a pattern of pro-business decisions by the Roberts Court). 
17. Michael Orey, The Supreme Court: Open for Business, Bloomberg Bus. 
Wk. (July 8, 2007), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2007-07-08/ 
the-supreme-court-open-for-business [https://perma.cc/2KWH-C5JK]. 
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from the kinds of big lawsuits that have bedeviled them for decades.”18 
Some legal academics agreed. For instance, Erwin Chemerinsky wrote 
that “the Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court of any since 
the mid-1930s.”19 All of this attention to the Roberts Court and its 
business decisions led to further academic research and scholarship 
examining whether and to what extent the Roberts Court could be 
considered “pro-business.”20 
Much of the early characterization of the Roberts Court as “pro-
business” has been based on specific Supreme Court decisions, such as 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.21 and Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Inc.,22 or specific Supreme Court terms, such as the 2006 term in which 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce won in thirteen of the fifteen cases in 
which it had filed a brief.23 Nonetheless, there have also been more 
systematic analyses of the Court and its disposition toward business 
interests. Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Richard Posner conducted 
one of the most well-known systematic empirical analyses of the Sup-
reme Court and business interests.24 In their study, Epstein, Landes, 
and Posner selected Supreme Court decisions from the 1946 term 
through the 2011 term of the Court in which a business entity was a 
litigant.25 They analyzed the likelihood that business entities would 
prevail in the Court over time.26 Controlling for numerous factors, they 
concluded: 
 
18. Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Comes to Defense of Business, Wall St. J. 
(June 23, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732399 
8604578563501419972228 [https://perma.cc/NN3X-H689]. 
19. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 Wayne L. Rev. 
947, 962 (2008). 
20. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 13, at 929 (discussing the relationship between 
the Roberts Court’s pro-business decisions and the conservative legal move-
ment); Business and the Roberts Court (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016) 
(including writings from prominent legal scholars concerning the Roberts 
Court’s business-related jurisprudence). 
21. 550 U.S. 618, 642–43 (2007) (holding that the statute of limitations barred 
recovery from the corporate defendant in an employee’s sex discrimination 
lawsuit to recover lost wages for unequal pay). 
22. 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (holding that a medical device manufacturer that 
satisfied federal Food and Drug Administration standards could not be sued 
under state tort law, because the federal regulations preempted the state tort 
law). 
23. E.g., Rosen, supra note 13, at 933. 
24. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3. 
25. Id. at 1434. 
26. Id. at 1437–48. 
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Whether measured by decisions or Justices’ votes, a plunge in 
warmth toward business during the 1960s (the heyday of the 
Warren Court) was quickly reversed; and the Roberts Court is 
much friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist 
Courts, which preceded it, were. The Court is taking more cases 
in which the business litigant lost in the lower court and reversing 
more of these—giving rise to the paradox that a decision in which 
certiorari is granted when the lower court decision was anti-
business is more likely to be reversed than one in which the lower 
court decision was pro-business. The Roberts Court also has 
affirmed more cases in which business is the respondent than its 
predecessor Courts did.27  
Thus, the Epstein, Landes, and Posner empirical study seems to con-
firm the conventional wisdom. 
B. Detractors and Skeptics Question the Conventional Wisdom 
Although there has been much commentary and analysis regarding 
the pro-business orientation of the Roberts Court, not everyone has 
jumped aboard the bandwagon. There are several different reactions to 
the conventional wisdom that the Robert Court is pro-business. For the 
sake of illustration, we consider just a few of those reactions here. 
Some resist the characterization of the Roberts Court as pro-busi-
ness altogether. For example, writing in 2009, Robin Conrad, while ser-
ving as the Executive Vice President of the National Chamber Litiga-
tion Center, called the “pro-business” characterization of the Roberts 
Court a “myth.”28 She argued that none of the analysis showed that the 
Justices were trying to favor businesses, but rather, “the recent business 
victories are the byproduct of the Justices’ and business community’s 
shared preferences for uniformity over conflicting legal regimes and for 
predictable laws and regulations.”29 
A more common reaction is to accept that, at a very general level, 
the Roberts Court can be characterized as pro-business insofar as it has 
accepted more cases involving economic and business issues.30 At an 
aggregate level, the Court had ruled in favor of business interests more 
 
27. Id. at 1471. 
28. Conrad, supra note 4, at 1000. 
29. Id. at 997. 
30. See James Surowiecki, Courting Business, New Yorker (Mar. 7, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/07/antonin-scalias-corporate-
influence [https://perma.cc/Y56B-XXD8] (“The Roberts Court hasn’t just 
made a lot of pro-business rulings. It has taken a higher percentage of cases 
brought by businesses than previous courts, and it has handed down far-
reaching decisions that have remade corporate regulation and law.”). 
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frequently than some past historical periods.31 Acceptance of the general 
trends, however, may not tell much about specific areas of the law or 
doctrinal developments. For instance, in his analysis of environmental 
cases, Jonathan Adler concludes that the Roberts Court is just as likely 
to rule in favor of government regulation of the environment as it is in 
favor of business groups who oppose such regulations.32 And in other 
areas of the law, the Court may be less interested in whether business 
wins than some other dimension of legal decision-making. For example, 
in his analysis of securities law, Adam Pritchard concluded that the 
justices in the Roberts Court were not particularly interested in the 
substantive legal issues involved in most securities litigation, but in-
stead focused on other aspects of those cases: “There are vigorous de-
bates among the justices in some of these cases, but they revolve around 
questions of statutory interpretation and the relationship between the 
judiciary and the administrative state.”33 
Another issue involves more general limits to quantitative analysis. 
In particular, the Epstein, Landes, and Posner study has been viewed 
as problematic for some because of the methodology used to simply 
code whether a business entity won or lost a particular case and aggre-
gate the results.34 As Adler argues, such an approach “doesn’t account 
for the content of the decisions or the doctrinal baseline. As a conse-
quence, a court may actually produce probusiness decisions that are less 
business friendly than decisions deemed ‘antibusiness.’”35 Under this 
logic, one is compelled to ask if the Roberts Court is limiting a cause of 
action against businesses. But if that cause of action was only first 
recognized twenty years ago, how can anyone conclude that the Court 
is being more pro-business than the Court of twenty-five years ago?36 
II. The Roberts Court and the Political Regime 
This Part turns to a different approach to analyzing the Roberts 
Court and cases involving business or economics issues. Although we 
 
31. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 1447–48. 
32. See Jonathan H. Adler, Business as Usual? The Roberts Court and Environ-
mental Law, in Business and the Roberts Court 287 (Jonathan H. Adler 
ed., 2016) (discussing the Roberts Court at the intersection of environmental 
regulation and business interests). 
33. A. C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court, in Business and the 
Roberts Court 94, 95 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016). 
34. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 1435 (describing the metho-
dology behind the creation of the dataset in the Epstein, Landes, and Posner 
study). 
35. Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction to Business and the Roberts Court 
1, 7 (Jonathan H. Adler, ed., 2016). 
36. Id. 
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agree with our academic lawyer colleagues that we should be ever 
mindful of the limitations of quantitative research in this area, as po-
litical scientists we think that having a general overview of trends on 
the Court is a good starting point for the analysis. However, we also 
take a different approach for our analysis of the Roberts Court than 
that of Epstein, Landes, and Posner. We draw from political regimes 
theory as a basis for understanding how legal change on the Supreme 
Court connects to broader political trends. As Pickerill has shown, 
trends on the Supreme Court in business and economics cases have 
occurred over several decades.37 In short, as the American polity became 
more conservative after the elections of 1968 and 1980, so did the Sup-
reme Court.38 And, thus, we should expect the Court to reflect those 
broader conservative, and pro-business, forces. The period of time since 
1968, however, has also been characterized by ideological and partisan 
polarization.39 So, we argue the best way to understand the Roberts 
Court’s decisions is as a function of a mostly conservative, but also 
highly polarized regime. In the first Section, we examine emergence of 
a New Right Regime, defined by the conservative economic policies of 
Republican Ronald Reagan and the moderation of the Democrats’ 
approach to economic policy under Democrat Bill Clinton. In the 
second Section, we note that while the regime became more conser-
vative over time, it also became more closely divided and polarized on 
ideological and partisan grounds, both of which influenced the direction 
of the Supreme Court in economics and business cases. 
A. The Roberts Court and the “New Right Regime” 
Law and court scholars have shown that elected political elites often 
support judicial power for many strategic purposes.40 Thus, the Court 
is not simply a counter-majoritarian institution that thwarts the will of 
democratically elected officials.41 Borrowing from the original insights 
of Robert Dahl, these scholars have identified numerous ways in which 
the Court is fundamentally connected to the elected branches of the 
federal government, demonstrating that the role of the Court in the 
 
37. See J. Mitchell Pickerill, Something Old, Something New—Something 
Borrowed, Something Blue, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1063 (2009) (dis]cussing 
reasons for the Supreme Court’s trend toward hearing more business and 
economic-based cases). 
38. Id. at 1084–99. 
39. See id. at 1067–68 (“[C]ommentary about the Roberts Court oftentimes 
focuses on the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions.”). 
40. See, e.g., id. at 1064.  
41. See generally Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the 
Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 933 (2001) 
(analyzing the counter-majoritarian perspective on legal scholarship and 
judicial review). 
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U.S. political system cannot properly be characterized as counter-
majoritarian.42 Instead, during any given historical period, the Court 
 
42. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court 
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957) (“To consider the Su-
preme Court of the United States strictly as a legal institution is to under-
estimate its significance in the American political system.”). For a normative 
defense of a “political Court” that plays an active role in national policy-
making, see generally Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of a 
Political Court (1999). In expanding on Dahl’s research, scholars have 
shown, for example, that elected officials might promote judicial policy-
making in order to avoid responsibility for making controversial policy 
choices. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative 
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 37–45 (1993) (dis-
cussing legislative deference to the judiciary); see also George I. Lovell, 
Legislative Deferrals 42–67 (2003) (providing examples of judicial 
policymaking, where the legislative process fails). Moreover, elected officials 
might also benefit from judicial review as a way to overcome entrenched 
interests or legislative obstructionists. Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose 
Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review 
by the United States Supreme Court, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 583, 583–86 
(2005) (explaining one purpose of judicial review is to overcome an 
obstructionist legislature). The Court may also manage divisions or cleavages 
within their own political coalition, such as when Democratic presidents 
during the 1940s–1960s encouraged the Court to reform American race rela-
tions as a way to circumvent opposition from powerful southern Democrats 
who controlled Congress. See generally Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren 
Court and American Politics (2000) (analyzing the Supreme Court at 
the intersection of American politics as a truly co-equal branch of government); 
Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the 
Development of American Constitutional Law (2004) (discussing how 
civil liberties and individual rights relate to political reform); Kevin J. 
McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency 
Paved the Road to Brown (2004) (describing judicial appointments as a 
means to meet a legislative end). Finally, elected officials might also want to 
empower courts as a way of entrenching policies and programs that they 
believe are becoming vulnerable to new or emerging electoral majorities. See 
generally Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Guess What Happened 
on the Way to Revolution? Precursors to the Supreme Court’s Federalism 
Revolution, 34 Publius: J. of Federalism 85 (2004) [hereinafter Clayton 
& Pickerill I] (rejecting portrayals of the Supreme Court as an autonomous 
entity that is independent from the effects of broader political dynamics); 
Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: 
How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice 
Jurisprudence, 94 Geo. L.J. 1385 (2006) [hereinafter Clayton & Pickerill II] 
(describing judicial review as a tool to repeal outdated legislation); Howard 
Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their 
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 511 (2002) (explaining the historic use of federal courts to entrench 
economic policies that were otherwise vulnerable to electoral politics); 
Thomas Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The 
Road to Modern Judicial Conservatism (2004) (tracing the origins of 
contemporary judicial conservatism); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian 
Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491 (1997) 
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operates as part of the political regime in which it exists. At a macro-
level, then, we should expect the Court’s outcomes to be consistent with 
the dominant values and policy preferences of the regime. In doing so, 
the Court assures the commitments of the political branches are gener-
ally credible.43 The political regimes literature has shown how Supreme 
Court decisions are often connected to specific patterns of party politics, 
group coalition building, critical elections, the policy agenda of elected 
officials, and other features of the regime.44 For example: 
A political regime is identified as existing during a discrete his-
torical period in which institutional arrangements and processes 
have distinct characteristics and remain relatively stable. Most 
notably, the period is characterized by a dominant electoral 
coalition associated with a particular political party as well a [sic] 
coherent policy agenda . . . . The life of a regime is marked by 
the construction of a new regime that replaces an old regime, 
reaches a zenith, and then unravels until another new regime 
replaces it . . . . At the beginning of a regime, presidents and 
other political leaders define and articulate the major values of 
the regime . . . .45 
Part of this process involves constructing new constitutional and legal 
meanings to validate the new agenda.46 Not surprisingly, the Supreme 
Court may eventually be called on to advance and extend these values.47 
Although a political regime is characterized by stability in insti-
tutional arrangements and political order, regimes are dynamic, and 
 
(criticizing the use of judicial review to undermine majority rule). For a 
comparative perspective, see generally Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristoc-
racy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 
(2004) (arguing that political elitism and judicial power, not commitments 
toward democracy, drive constitutionalism). 
43. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent 
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975) 
(explaining the judiciary’s relationship with other branches of government 
through empirical analysis). 
44. For an overview of “political regimes” or “political construction” literature, 
see Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 
425 (2005) (discussing the evolution and emergence of modern-day judicial 
review); see also Howard Gillman, Courts and the Politics of Partisan 
Coalitions, in The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 644 (Keith 
E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008) (discussing new approaches to understanding 
how the law organizes, exercises, and protects political power). 
45. J. Mitchell Pickerill, Is the Roberts Court Business Friendly? Is the Pope 
Catholic?, in Business and the Roberts Court 50–51 (Jonathan H. 
Adler ed., 2016). 
46. Id. at 51. 
47. Id. 
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political and legal changes occur within—as well as across—regimes. 
Political change is often the result of a process of what Carmines and 
Stimson have called “issue evolution.”48 According to issue evolution 
theory, changes in the political system are rarely created by the swift, 
seismic event; political change often takes place more gradually through 
“dynamic evolution of new issues.”49 
The historical course of change evolves during a political regime 
and can be thought of as occurring during a cycle in which political 
institutions and actors find themselves in different inter-relationships 
in the regime, and with varying opportunities, levels of power, and 
constraints or limitations on that power—Stephen Skowronek labels as 
this cycle “political time.”50 For example, reconstructive presidents 
stand in opposition to the agenda and values of a declining regime, and 
they possess greater opportunities to articulate and reconstitute the 
political order.51 Articulation presidents are from the same party as the 
dominant party of the regime and are committed to regime values at a 
time when the regime remains dominant.52 Preemptive presidents are 
opposed to the dominant political party, agenda, and values at a time 
when the regime remains strong.53 They are therefore constrained in 
their abilities to effect change. They will often find themselves having 
to find ways to neutralize key cleavage issues between their party and 
the dominant party, and much of their success may be defined by their 
ability to moderate the more extreme policies and stances in the existing 
regime.54 Lastly, disjunctive presidents hold office during the twilight 
of a declining regime.55 They are usually blamed for political, economic, 
 
48. See generally Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, Issue 
Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics 
(1989) (introducing the theoretical framework of “issue evolution” to under-
stand political changes through the biological theory of natural selection). 
49. Id. at 158. 
50. Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership 
from John Adams to Bill Clinton 49–52 (2d ed. 1997). 
51. E.g., id. at 62–85, 130–54, 198–227, 288–324, 414–29 (discussing the presi-
dencies of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin 
Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan). 
52. E.g., id. at 86–109, 155–76, 228–59, 325–60, 429–42 (discussing the presi-
dencies of James Monroe, James Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, 
and George H.W. Bush). 
53. E.g., id. at 43–45 (discussing the presidencies of John Tyler, Andrew 
Johnson, Woodrow Wilson, and Richard Nixon). 
54. E.g., id. at 45–49 (discussing the presidencies of Woodrow Wilson, Dwight 
Eisenhower, Calvin Coolidge, and Grover Cleveland). 
55. E.g., id. at 110–27, 177–96, 260–85, 361–406 (discussing the presidencies of 
John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Herbert Hoover, 
and Jimmy Carter). 
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or social problems as the once-dominant coalition is falling apart, and 
they provide an easy target for reconstructive presidents as they build 
a new dominant electoral coalition, shatter the old regime, and 
reconstitute the regime.56 
The Supreme Court exists within political time, too. According to 
Keith Whittington, “[t]he Court does not exist outside of political time, 
but rather both helps determine political time and occupies a position 
within it.”57 Reconstructive presidents often face a hostile Court, app-
ointed by the previous regime, and are thus committed to that regime’s 
agenda and values.58 In time, reconstructive presidents will successfully 
transform the Court through appointments or other mechanisms and 
reorient it to support new regime values.59 As Whittington acknowle-
dges, “[t]he politics of reconstruction hinges on the ability of the presi-
dent to bolster his authority to define the new regime and to wrest 
control over the definition of the constitutional order from other poli-
tical actors, including the judiciary.”60 
On the one hand, the Court may even “be used as a foil to enhance 
the president’s own authority,” in part because “[p]olitically isolated, 
judges make a particularly good representative of the old, discredited 
commitments and entrenched interests.”61 On the other hand, preemp-
tive presidents find themselves in a very different position relative to 
the Court. Preemptive presidents are not usually “in a position to 
launch the reconstructive project. Preemptive presidents will instead 
have to pick their shots.”62 These presidents often are “reformers within 
their own party,” finding ways to neutralize cleavage issues that have 
hurt their party’s electoral bids “by blurring party distinctions and 
offering themselves up as a moderate administrator of the consensus 
ideology.”63 Therefore, these presidents will not be in a very strong 
position to challenge the Court, but may find ways to support the Court 
in the name of consensus or moderation. 
Elsewhere, we have argued that a “New Right Regime” emerged 
over a period of time beginning in the late 1960s, solidifying itself with 
 
56. Id. at 39–41. 
57. Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supre-
macy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional 
Leadership in U.S. History 75 (2007). 
58. Id. at 72. 
59. Id. at 73. 
60. Id. at 76. 
61. Id. at 77. 
62. Id. at 161. 
63. Id. at 162. 
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the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.64 A full review of the rise of the 
New Right regime is unnecessary here. In sum, as the New Deal coali-
tion of northern and southern Democrats became increasingly fragmen-
ted, especially over civil rights in the 1960s, the Republican Party 
capitalized on those divisions and seized on issues intended to poach 
some members of that coalition, especially southern Democrats.65 Begin-
ning with Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy,” and culminating in the 
election of Ronald Reagan, Republicans were able to exploit the fissures 
in the Democratic party, begin defining several emerging cleavage iss-
ues, sharpen the differences between themselves and the Democrats, 
and court the voters who eventually became known as “Reagan Demo-
crats.”66 Reagan was elected and is viewed as a reconstructive presi-
dent—replacing many of the values and commitments of the New Deal 
Regime with more conservative values and commitments. 
What is important for our purposes here is that Reagan advocated 
a pro-business agenda that included deregulation, tax relief, and supply-
side economics as a core component of the New Right Regime.67 Reagan 
and his Republican allies sought to replace what they viewed as an anti-
business agenda with a more business-friendly agenda.68 Although much 
of Reagan’s agenda was opposed by Democrats in the 1980s, Democratic 
elites’ views on economic regulation and business shifted to a more 
moderate and consensus position by the 1990s; it was a key issue that 
had been a cleavage issue between Democrats and Republicans and 
which Clinton—a preemptive president—managed to neutralize.69 
 
64. See Clayton & Pickerill I, supra note 42 (describing the revival of federalism 
in the 1960s as a result of shifting politics and party platforms); Clayton & 
Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1386. 
65. See Clayton & Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1395–99 (explaining how “the 
GOP [drove] a wedge deep into the New Deal Democratic political coalition, 
separating its southern Democratic congressional base from its more pro-
gressive presidential electoral party”). 
66. Id. at 1395–1403. 
67. See Clayton & Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1390–91 (describing how 
Republicans expanded federal court power “to protect pro-business, laissez-
faire economic policies that were threatened by the rise of Progressive 
political power”). 
68.  See id. at 1389–90 (describing the Supreme Court under President Raegan 
as a mechanism to codify conservative business principles that favored bus-
inesses). 
69.  Jon F. Hale, The Making of the New Democrats, 110 Pol. Sci. Q. 207, 207 
(1995). 
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In 1992, Bill Clinton ran as a “New Democrat,”70 and the unofficial 
campaign slogan was “It’s the economy, stupid.”71 Clinton attempted 
to neutralize several key cleavage issues that seemed to plague the Dem-
ocrats’ presidential candidates in three successive presidential elections. 
One of those was the perception that Democrats were for “big govern-
ment” and anti-business. As the 1992 Democratic Platform made clear, 
Clinton and his supporters advocated for a new economic policy:  
Just as we have always viewed working men and women as the 
bedrock of our economy, we honor business as a noble endeavor 
. . . . We believe in free enterprise and the power of market forces. 
But economic growth will not come without a national economic 
strategy to invest in people.72 
Thus, in 1992, Clinton set out to neutralize what had been a losing 
issue for the Democrats, and, by the end of his presidency, deficit re-
duction and the promotion of free trade were widely regarded as two of 
Clinton’s most significant accomplishments.73 
And so by the 1990s, a type of consensus had emerged across party 
lines on economic policy.74 Excessive government regulation of the econ-
omy and business was disfavored; economic growth, deficit reduction, 
and free trade had become widely agreed upon objectives of political 
elites in the national government.75 There is good reason to believe this 
political consensus might influence law and migrate to the Court. 
Scholars have chronicled the rise of conservatism as a political force 
influencing the direction of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, mostly 
as a result of judicial appointments.76 As far as the Supreme Court is 
 
70. Id. at 224–28 (describing Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign as a movement 
against Raegan economics, designed to unify the Democratic party). 
71. Jerry Jasinowski, It’s the Economy, Stupid, Huffington Post: The Blog 
(Nov. 5, 2016, 9:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-jasinowski/ 
presidential-debates_b_8478456.html [https://perma.cc/UM6T-LW7C]. 
72. Political Party Platforms: 1992 Democratic Party Platform, Am. 
Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid 
=29610#axzz1b7MdZItj [https://perma.cc/4LWX-6GCD] (last visited Mar. 
3, 2017). 
73. See Alex Waddan, Clinton’s Legacy? A New Democrat in Gover-
nance 44–68 (2002) (describing the Clinton Administration’s approach to 
economic reform). For a broader range of perspectives on the Clinton legacy, 
see generally The Clinton Legacy (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman 
eds., 2000) (chronicling economic policies under the Clinton Administration). 
74. See Waddan, supra note 73, at 46–59 (describing Clinton’s efforts to craft 
an economic policy that prioritized deficit reduction). 
75. Id. 
76. See, e.g., Clayton & Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1388–94 (chronicling the 
political construction of judicial power). 
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concerned then, we would expect Reagan-Bush judicial appointees to 
support at a general level the commitments and policies of the New 
Right Regime. It is well documented that Reagan and his advisors, to 
whom Reagan delegated great authority over judicial appointments, 
“had a more coherent and ambitious agenda for legal reform and judi-
cial selection than any previous administration.”77 According to David 
O’Brien, “[i]ndisputably, Reagan’s Justice Department systematically 
and effectively infused its legal policy goals into the judicial selection 
process.”78 The appointment of conservative judges was greatly facilita-
ted by the growing conservative legal movement, which promoted con-
servative legal values through various conservative foundations, think 
tanks and related groups, such as the Olin Foundation, the Federalist 
Society, the Law and Economics Center, the Center for Individual 
Rights, and the Institute for Justice.79 
Reagan’s judicial appointments have been deemed his “best leg-
acy,” in large part because federal courts gradually became more conser-
vative and supported the conservative legal agenda.80 The Reagan 
judicial strategy has mostly been identified with an effort to reverse the 
liberal activism in the Warren and early Burger Courts, and especially 
with salient social issues, such as prayer in public schools, abortion, and 
crime.81 
It is important to remember, however, that a key part of Reagan’s 
legal policy agenda was related to his economic policy agenda. 
According to Steven Teles, the “first conservative public interest law 
firm, the Pacific Legal Foundation” which was founded in 1973 in 
California while Reagan was Governor was an effort to counter liberal 
Public Interest Law Firms (PILFs).82 This was because “[c]onservatives 
 
77. David M. O’Brien, The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring Legacy?, in 
The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance 60, 62 (Charles O. 
Jones ed., 1988). 
78. Id. at 67. 
79. See generally Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal 
Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (2008) (explaining 
the history of the conservative legal movement and the impact of law and 
economics on the creation of governmental and nongovernmental organiza-
tions); Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Ideas with Consequences: The Fed-
eralist Society and the Conservative Counterrevolution (2015) 
(detailing the impact of the Federalist Society on public policy and the role 
of the judiciary). 
80. O’Brien, supra note 77, at 60. 
81. See David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Pol-
itics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees 133–35 (1999) 
(describing Reagan’s efforts to cultivate conservative decision making within 
the courts). 
82. Teles, supra note 79, at 60–61. 
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in government, especially Ronald Reagan during his stint as governor 
of California from 1967–1975, found their agenda obstructed by liberal 
PILFs.”83 The law and economics movement emerged as an approach 
to law in which the primary objective of law is economic efficiency, 
which then migrated into elite law schools such as the University of 
Chicago, Yale University, Harvard University, and beyond.84 Not sur-
prisingly, Supreme Court appointments by Reagan and both Bushes 
could be expected to subscribe to these views on law and economics. 
But what may be just as important for thinking about the Supreme 
Court and cases involving economic policy is the place that President 
Clinton occupied in the regime. Clinton was a preemptive president 
who moderated the positions of his party in order to neutralize or 
preempt important cleavage issues that had disadvantaged Democrats 
at the polls in three previous national elections. Clinton appointed Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg to replace Justice White, and a year later Stephen 
Breyer to replace Justice Harry Blackmun.85 Both of these selections 
were considered “safe” in the sense that they were viewed as judicial 
moderates, and both were acceptable to Orrin Hatch, Republican of 
Utah, the ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee.86 
According to Michael Gerhardt, Clinton decided not to pursue nomin-
ees on ideological grounds, but instead “on the grounds of their appeal 
to certain constituencies, age and health, and likelihood for confirma-
tion.”87 Although both of Clinton’s nominees were easily confirmed, 
Silverstein notes that “[t]he ease with which both Ginsburg and Breyer 
gained Senate approval must not obscure the degree to which their 
appointments were the product of political conflict and weakness.”88 
Clinton’s appointments to the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
and Stephen Breyer, reflected his more moderate position on the issues 
he had worked to preempt and avoided difficult partisan fights. 
And thus, by the time John Roberts was appointed to replace Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in 2005, issues involving business and economic regu-
lation were not significant cleavage issues in national politics. Given the 
GOP legal and judicial strategy to transform law to reflect conservative 
 
83. Id. at 60. 
84. Id. at 181–216. 
85. Yalof, supra note 81, at 199–205.  
86. Orrin Hatch, Square Peg: Confessions of a Citizen Senator 180 
(2002). 
87. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A Con-
stitutional and Historical Analysis 76 (2000). See also Yalof, supra 
note 81, at 196–205 (explaining President Clinton’s appointment strategy for 
both Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg). 
88. Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme 
Court Confirmations 121 (2d ed. 2007). 
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policy priorities, and both Clinton’s more moderate approach to eco-
nomic policy and the appointment of more centrist justices to the Sup-
reme Court, we should expect over this time period the Court would 
adopt positions less favorable to government regulation of the economy, 
and thus more favorable toward businesses and employers. Although it 
is possible to trace the development of a New Right Regime as an expla-
nation for trends in economics and business cases as a function of that 
regime, there’s another fact of American government during the New 
Right Regime that must be accounted for: division and polarization. 
B. The Regime and the Court in an Era of Divided Government  
and Polarization 
While American electoral history is generally understood as a series 
of “party systems” or “political regimes” brought about by “critical” or 
“secular” realignments that produce a dominant party coalition that 
governs for a period of time and then declines to be replaced by a new 
electoral order,89 the period since 1968 is different. During the 1960s, 
the New Deal electoral coalition, which dominated American politics 
since the 1930s, slowly unraveled over a series of issues including race 
and civil rights reforms.90 As we discussed in the previous Section, be-
ginning with Nixon’s “southern strategy” in 1968, and culminating in 
the “Reagan Revolution” in the 1980s, the GOP capitalized on fragmen-
tation within the Democratic Party and brought disaffected southern 
Democrats, religious evangelicals, and other groups into a more conser-
vative coalition which consequently became a more competitive force 
in national elections.91 As we explained in the previous Section, the 
“New Right” has had important impacts on the direction of political 
and policy agendas, including on attitudes toward the regulation of the 
economy and business. 
 
89. See generally Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the 
Mainsprings of American Politics (1970) (analyzing critical elections in 
U.S. history where a critical realignment predicated an abrupt coalitional 
change among the electorate); Skowronek, supra note 50 (analyzing the 
impact of various U.S. presidents on the evolution of modern politics); 1 
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) (analyzing the 
interplay between the legislature, the executive, and the judicial branches, 
as well as the subsequent impact on U.S. policies). 
90. See generally Carmines & Stimson, supra note 48 (considering the trans-
formation of the American political order based on the emergence of racial 
politics). 
91. Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: 
Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988 (1990) (detailing the 
rise of the GOP, as well as growing partisanship in a divided government). 
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In hindsight, however, it is clear that neither 1968 nor 1980 were 
anything like classic realigning elections.92 Rather than the emergence 
of a party coalition that was as stable and dominant as previous coali-
tions (such as the New Deal Coalition), electoral politics during this 
period have remained closely divided for an extended period and the 
parties have become ideologically more sorted and polarized.93 This has 
led to alternating partisan control of electoral institutions and divided 
government. Indeed, between 1968 and 2016, Democrats have won five 
presidential elections and Republicans seven.94 Divided government, 
where one party controls the presidency and the other controls one or 
both houses of Congress, has prevailed in thirty-eight of the past forty-
eight years.95 
Although control of the presidency has been split between the 
parties, opportunities to fill vacancies on the Supreme Court have not. 
Of the sixteen justices appointed since 1968, twelve were appointed by 
Republicans and only four by Democrats.96 While partisanship has not 
 
92. See Byron E. Shafer, The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of 
Modern American Politics 26–38 (2003) (contrasting the elections from 
1948 through the 1990s to identify which elections reflected a “new political 
order” of partisan loyalties). 
93. See generally Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged 
Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy (2010) (finding that 
party loyalty today is based more on ideological beliefs rather than social 
group identification, resulting in increased political polarization and higher 
voter turnout); Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How 
Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republi-
cans (2009) (explaining how American voters have rapidly realigned them-
selves based on ideological commitments); Nolan McCarty, Keith T. 
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of 
Ideology and Unequal Riches (2006) (examining voter polarization in 
recent decades and its relationship with wealth disparity, immigration, and 
other social forces). 
94. The GOP won presidential elections in 1968 and 1972 (Richard M. Nixon), 
1980 and 1984 (Ronald Reagan), 1988 (George H. W. Bush), and 2000 and 
2004 (George W. Bush). Democrats won in 1976 (Jimmy Carter), 1992 and 
1996 (Bill Clinton), and 2008 and 2012 (Barack Obama). 1789–2016 Presi-
dential Elections, Nat. Archives and Records Admin., https://www. 
archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/votes/ [https://perma.cc/ 
97MJ-9QD4] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017). 
95. See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, U. S. House of 
Representatives: Hist., Art & Archives, http://history.house.gov/ 
Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ [https://perma.cc/3BK2-285B] 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (detailing party divides in the U.S. House of 
Representatives over time); Party Division, U. S. Senate, https://www 
.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/86RH-CMFP] (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2017) (chronicling party divisions in the U.S. Senate). 
96. GOP appointments include: Warren Burger (1969–86); Harry Blackmun 
(1970–94); Lewis Powell (1972–87); William Rehnquist (1972–2005); John 
Paul Stevens (1975–2010); Sandra Day O’Connor (1981–2006); Antonin 
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always been a predictor of a justice’s behavior on the bench, the current 
era’s more ideologically rigorous nomination process has produced a 
Court where justices vote predictably along partisan/ideological lines.97 
The GOP’s advantage in filling vacancies on the Court, including the 
appointment of the last three chief justices, has thus led to a more 
conservative Court, but, at the same time, the alternating control of 
government has created one that is deeply divided and polarized. In-
deed, the Roberts Court in 2016 consisted of four Democratic appoin-
tees who voted in a liberal direction, four Republican appointees who 
voted in a conservative direction, and a ninth seat that remained vacant 
and was the subject of fierce partisan conflict in the 2016 presidential 
election.98 
And so this extended period of divided government and polarization 
overlapped with the emergence of a New Right Regime that sought to 
replace the old New Deal Regime.99 The upshot of this overlap is that 
Reagan conservatives were able to influence law and politics in a 
conservative direction, but the New Right coalition was fragile from the 
beginning.100 It was never able to fully consolidate power in the ways 
majority coalition in previous regimes (such as the New Deal coalition 
and regime) had.101 
 
Scalia (1986–2016); Anthony Kennedy (1987–present); David Souter (1990–
2009); Clarence Thomas (1991–present); John Roberts (2005–present); and 
Samuel Alito (2006–present). The Democratic appointees include: Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg (1993–present); Stephen Breyer (1994–present); Sonia Soto-
mayor (2009–present); and Elena Kagan (2010–present). Members of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Supreme Court of the U.S., https:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/45KJ-
YAF4] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017). 
97. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics 
of Judicial Appointments 60–65, 130–37 (2005) (explaining how recent 
presidential appointments ensure that the appointee’s ideological beliefs align 
with the appointing president’s political persuasions); Neal Devins & 
Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the 
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming 
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432111 [https://perma.cc/97ST-2B5T] 
(examining the effects of party polarization on the Supreme Court over 
time). 
98. Joan Biskupic, John Roberts Gets Another Chance for a Conservative 
Legacy, CNN (Nov. 10, 2016, 2:42 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/ 
09/politics/us-supreme-court-john-roberts/ [https://perma.cc/NF9X-V5Q5]. 
99. See supra Part II.A. 
100. See Clayton & Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1403–06 (describing Reagan’s 
influence on drug laws).  
101. See supra Part II.A.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Roberts Court and Economic Issues in an Era of Polarization 
712 
III. Analysis 
In this Part, we replicate much of Pickerill’s analysis of the votes 
and outcomes of cases involving economic regulations and labor issues 
through the 2015 term of the Court.102 However, we also analyze the 
Court’s 5–4 decisions in order to assess the impact of polarization on 
the Court. In order to assess the behavior of the Roberts Court toward 
business interests, we analyzed data from the U.S. Supreme Court 
Database (the “Database”).103 The Database codes numerous variables 
for every Supreme Court decision from the beginning of the Vinson 
Court through the end of the 2015 term of the Roberts Court.104 Among 
the many variables included in the database are the type of issue 
involved in the case, the attitudinal, or ideological, direction of each 
decision, and the direction of individual justice’s vote in each case.105 
Votes in favor of business interests are coded as being in the “conser-
vative” direction, and votes in favor of government regulation, unions, 
or labor interests are coded as being in the “liberal” direction.106 
We selected cases that were argued before the Court, decided on 
the merits, and involved the issue areas of “union activity” and “eco-
nomic activity.”107 Union activity cases involve arbitration in the con-
text of labor-management or employer-employee relations, union anti-
trust, closed shop litigation, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, union membership disputes, and a host 
of other labor-management disputes. Economic activity cases include 
antitrust, mergers, bankruptcy, liability, punitive damages, the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act, and a wide range of other gov-
ernment regulations of the economy and business activity. Votes in 
 
102. See Pickerill, supra note 37 (exploring the Court’s decisions based on its 
ideological composition); Pickerill, supra note 45 (analyzing the Court’s 
decisions and voting patterns in business-oriented cases). 
103. The Supreme Court Database, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, https://scdb. 
wustl.edu/index.php [https://perma.cc/53CD-ZRPW] (last visited Mar. 4, 
2017). 
104. Id.  
105. Id.  
106. We understand that some may object to the use of these ideological labels 
in this manner, but this approach follows the conventions of analysis of 
judicial behavior in political science and provides a simple and fairly clear 
way for readers to understand the results of our analysis. 
107. The union activity issue area includes, among other issues, cases involving 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and 
a range of labor-management disputes. The economic activity code includes 
a wide range of economic regulations, and includes antitrust, bankruptcy, 
mergers, patents, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, and 
liability and punitive damages. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Roberts Court and Economic Issues in an Era of Polarization 
713 
these cases are coded as “conservative” for votes in favor of business 
interests and against government regulation or union authority, and 
conversely, they are coded as being in the “liberal” direction for votes 
in favor of government regulation of economic activity or union author-
ity and against the interests of private businesses.108 
If we want to know if and how the Roberts Court compares to 
previous courts, a logical starting point is to examine how the behavior 
of the newest justices differs from their predecessors, if at all. We 
analyze the individual votes of Rehnquist and Roberts, O’Connor and 
Alito, Souter and Sotomayor, and Stevens and Kagan in these issue 
areas by computing the total number of votes in the conservative and 
liberal directions for each justice. As the results in Table 1 indicate, 
four justices have been more likely to vote in the conservative, or pro-
business, direction in these cases, while four have been slightly more 
likely to vote against business interests. 
  
 
108. The Supreme Court database has been criticized, especially with respect to 
the coding of legal provisions. See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: 
Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 Hastings 
L.J. 477 (2009) (discussing the shortcomings of the Supreme Court data-
base). While we agree with some of the criticisms of the way law is treated 
(and sometimes ignored) in the database, it remains a useful tool for ana-
lyzing general trends in Supreme Court outcomes in broad issue areas. It is 
possible, indeed probable, that the issue areas of economic and union activity 
are both under inclusive and over inclusive (that is, they may not include 
every case the Court has ever decided with business implications, and they 
may include some cases that do not directly implicate pro- or anti-business 
legal analysis). However, given that much of the commentary—by both 
Court supporters and Court detractors—on the relationship between the 
Roberts Court and (big) business is indeed based on outcomes, analysis of 
those outcomes at an aggregate level is still useful. We understand it is al-
most certainly true that not all cases analyzed here are equally as important 
as one another, and that interpretive analysis is necessary to tease out which, 
if any, of the Roberts Court decisions are likely to have significant implications 
for future doctrinal development. Nonetheless, the database is useful for our 
purposes here because it codes the Supreme Court outcomes in a consistent 
manner over time. 
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Table 1. Direction of Votes by Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, 
Roberts, Alito, Souter and Sotomayor in Union and  
Economic Activity Cases 
 
JUSTICE 
UNION 
ACTIVITY 
ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 
COMBINED 
TOTAL 
 conser
vative 
liberal conserv
ative 
liberal conser
vative 
liberal 
 
Rehnquist 
 
85 
(58%) 
 
61 
(42%) 
 
387 
(53%) 
 
337 
(47%) 
 
472 
(54%) 
 
398 
(46%) 
 
Roberts 
 
12 
(63%) 
 
7 
(37%) 
 
97 
(55%) 
 
79 
(45%) 
 
109 
(56%) 
 
86 
(44%) 
 
O’Connor 
 
51 
(59%) 
 
36 
(41%) 
 
248 
(53%) 
 
217 
(47%) 
 
299 
(54%) 
 
253 
(46%) 
 
Alito 
 
13 
(72%) 
 
5 
(28%) 
 
99 
(58%) 
 
71 
(42%) 
 
112 
(60%) 
 
76 
(40%) 
 
Souter 
 
16 
(44%) 
 
20 
(56%) 
 
140 
(46%) 
 
166 
(54%) 
 
156 
(46%) 
 
186 
(54%) 
 
Sotomayor 
 
6 
(40%) 
 
9 
(60%) 
 
55 
(50%) 
 
56 
(50%) 
 
61 
(48%) 
 
65 
(52%) 
 
Stevens 
 
47 
(37%) 
 
80 
(63%) 
 
307 
(44%) 
 
391 
(56%) 
 
354 
(43%) 
 
471 
(57%) 
 
Kagan 
 
4 
(36%) 
 
7 
(56%) 
 
48 
(48%) 
 
49 
(52%) 
 
52 
(48%) 
 
56 
(52%) 
Rehnquist and O’Connor each voted in the conservative, or pro-
business, direction in most of the decisions involving union activity and 
economic activity during their time on the Court. As the far right-hand 
column of Table 1 indicates, Rehnquist voted in the conservative 
direction in 472 of 870 decisions, or fifty-four percent of the time, while 
O’Connor voted in the conservative direction in 318 of 551 decisions, 
also fifty-four percent of the time, in cases involving union or economic 
activity. Roberts has voted in the conservative direction in 109 of 195 
decisions, or fifty-six percent of the time, while Alito has voted in the 
conservative direction in 112 of 188 of these decisions, or sixty percent 
of the time; in other words, Roberts and Alito were slightly more likely 
to vote in a pro-business than the justices they replaced. Unlike these 
four more conservative justices, Souter, Sotomayor, Stevens, and Kagan 
voted in the liberal direction, against business interests, a little more 
than half the time. Souter voted in the liberal direction in 156 of 342 
decisions, or about fifty-four percent of the time, and Sotomayor voted 
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in the liberal direction in 61 of 126 decisions, or about fifty-two percent 
of the time. Similarly, Stevens voted in the liberal direction in 471 of 
825, or fifty-seven percent of the time, and Kagan voted in the liberal 
direction 56 of 108 decisions, or about fifty-two percent of the time. 
Given that the Roberts Court was initially delineated by the 
appointment of Roberts as Chief Justice in September 2005, and Alito’s 
nomination was confirmed a few months later in the same term in 
January 2006, Roberts and Alito have voted in fewer cases than 
Rehnquist and O’Connor. And Sotomayor and Kagan have cast even 
fewer votes. Thus, it is important to be cautious in drawing conclusions 
from their votes so far. While we must be cautious in making inferences, 
these data points do constitute the population of cases in these issue 
areas through the end of the 2016 term; thus, we can, at a minimum, 
draw some conclusions about the first decade of the Roberts Court, 
including President Obama’s appointments to the Court. The analysis 
in this Part indicates that Roberts and Alito were slightly more likely 
to vote in the conservative direction than the two justices they replaced; 
Sotomayor and Kagan voted in the liberal direction a little less than 
the justices they replaced, but they were still more likely to vote in the 
liberal rather than conservative direction. 
Based on the analysis of the newest justices to the Court, the ide-
ological balance of the Court does not seem to have shifted much as a 
result of the membership changes. The next step of the inquiry is to 
ask how the membership change on the Court has affected outcomes in 
business-oriented cases. Therefore, our analysis moves from comparing 
the votes of individual justices on the Court to the outcomes of the 
Court’s decisions over time. 
Table 2 reports the direction of these decisions for the Vinson, 
Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. The results show that 
the Roberts Court’s decisions have resulted in a higher proportion of 
pro-business outcomes than previous periods, as demarcated by chief 
justice. While only forty-four percent of Vinson Court decisions and 
twenty-seven percent of the Warren Court decisions in union activity 
and economic activity cases were in the conservative direction, the per-
centage increased in subsequent Courts, to forty-seven percent during 
the Burger Court, fifty-one percent in the Rehnquist Court, and finally, 
fifty-nine percent in the Roberts Court. In the economic activity issue 
area alone, the Roberts Court has decided fifty-eight percent of cases 
in the conservative direction, compared to fifty percent during the 
Rehnquist Court, forty-eight percent during the Burger Court, twenty-
seven percent during the Warren Court, and forty-one percent during 
the Vinson Court. 
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Table 2. Direction of Supreme Court Outcomes in Union and 
Economic Activity Cases by Chief Justice (through the 2015 term)109 
CHIEF 
JUSTICE 
UNION 
ACTIVITY 
ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 
COMBINED 
TOTAL 
 conserv
ative 
liberal conserv
ative 
liberal conserv
ative 
liberal 
Vinson 
Court 
23  
(56%) 
18 
(44%) 
93 
(41%) 
132 
(59%) 
116 
(44%) 
150 
(56%) 
 
Warren 
Court 
 
41  
(32%) 
 
89 
(68%) 
 
134 
(27%) 
 
355 
(73%) 
 
170 
(27%) 
 
453 
(73%) 
 
Burger 
Court 
 
48  
(44%) 
 
61 
(56%) 
 
211 
(48%) 
 
230 
(52%) 
 
259 
(47%) 
 
291 
(53%) 
 
Rehnquist 
Court 
 
31 
(57%) 
 
23 
(43%) 
 
171 
(50%) 
 
171 
(40%) 
 
202 
(51%) 
 
194 
(49%) 
 
Roberts 
Court 
 
12 
(63%) 
 
5 
(37%) 
 
105 
(58%) 
 
75 
(42%) 
 
117 
(59%) 
 
82 
(41%) 
And so the Roberts Court as a whole appears to be more likely to 
vote in the conservative direction than the Court under the previous 
four chief justices, which is consistent with much of the conventional 
wisdom about the Roberts Court becoming more business-friendly than 
Courts in previous eras. It has also been suggested by some commen-
tators that the Roberts Court is also accepting more business cases.110 
Table 3 reports the total number of Supreme Court decisions and the 
proportion of those decisions that were union or economic activity cases 
by chief justice. As Table 3 indicates, the proportion of the Court’s 
docket involving union activity has been on the decline for decades, and 
the Roberts Court has followed suit, constituting only about two per-
cent of its docket. Twenty-one percent of the Roberts Court decisions 
have been in the economic activity issue area, which is only slightly up 
from seventeen and sixteen percent in the Rehnquist and Burger 
Courts, respectively, but is still less than the Warren and Vinson 
Courts, at twenty-two and twenty-nine percent, respectively. 
  
 
109. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors. 
110. Rosen, supra note 1. 
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Table 3. Union and Economic Activity Cases as Proportion of 
Court Agenda 
CHIEF 
JUSTICE 
UNION 
ACTIVITY 
(% of N) 
ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 
(% of N) 
 
TOTAL 
(% of N) 
 
Vinson Court 
(N=786) 
 
41 (5%) 
 
225 (29%) 
 
266 (34%) 
 
Warren Court 
(N=2189) 
 
130 (6%) 
 
479 (22%) 
 
609 (28%) 
 
Burger Court 
(N=2798) 
 
109 (4%) 
 
441 (16%) 
 
550 (20%) 
 
Rehnquist 
Court (N=2029) 
 
54 (3%) 
 
342 (17%) 
 
396 (20%) 
 
Roberts Court 
(N=867) 
 
17 (2%) 
 
180 (21%) 
 
197 (23%) 
Although the analysis so far does suggest that the Roberts Court 
has ruled against government regulation of the economy and labor more 
frequently than its predecessors, the political regimes approach for un-
derstanding shifts on the Court requires a different analytical approach. 
Rather than adopt the chief justice as the unit of analysis, we demark 
time periods based on presidents and their first appointment to the 
Court. Thus, we analyzed outcomes during periods beginning with the 
first Supreme Court appointment of Harry S. Truman (Fred Vinson in 
1946), Dwight Eisenhower (Earl Warren in 1953), Richard Nixon 
(Warren Burger in 1969), Ronald Reagan (Sandra Day O’Connor in 
1981), Bill Clinton (Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1993), George W. Bush 
(John Roberts in 2005), and Barack Obama (Sotomayor in 2009). Each 
period—until the appointment of John Roberts in 2005—spans roughly 
the same amount of time, twelve or thirteen years.111 
As Table 4 shows, the trend in the Court’s pro-business orientation 
began with President Nixon’s appointments. While the Court decided 
fifty-six percent of union and economic cases in a liberal (pro-union or 
pro-government regulation) direction from Truman’s appointment of 
Vinson in 1946 until Eisenhower’s appointment of Warren in 1953, and 
seventy-three percent in the liberal direction from Warren’s appoint-
ment until Nixon’s appointment of Burger in 1969, it decided only fifty-
three percent in the liberal direction from the appointment of Burger 
until Reagan’s appointment of O’Connor in 1981. After 1981, the Court 
continued to trend in a pro-business direction in these cases, and be-
 
111. Supreme Court of the U.S., supra note 96. 
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tween 1981 and Clinton’s appointment of Ginsburg, the Court was al-
most evenly split, deciding forty-nine percent in the liberal direction 
and fifty-one percent conservative (or pro-business) direction. From 
Clinton’s appointment of Ginsburg in 1993 until Bush’s appointment 
of John Roberts in 2005, the Court continued the trend and decided 
fifty-four percent of these cases in the conservative direction. From the 
appointment of Roberts until Obama’s appointment of Sotomayor in 
2009, the Court decided sixty-one percent in the conservative direction, 
and since Sotomayor’s appointment, the Court has decided fifty-seven 
percent of these cases in the conservative direction. 
Table 4. Direction of Supreme Court Outcomes in Union and 
Economic Activity Cases based on first Supreme Court  
Appointment of Presidents112 
President 
(Justice 
appointed) 
UNION 
ACTIVITY 
ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 
COMBINED 
TOTAL 
 conserv
ative 
liberal conserv
ative 
liberal conserv
ative 
liberal 
 
Truman-
1946 
(Vinson) 
 
23 
(56%) 
 
18 
(44%) 
 
93  
(41%) 
 
132 
(59%) 
 
116 
(44%) 
  
150 
(56%) 
 
Eisenhower-
1953 
(Warren) 
 
42 
(32%) 
 
89 
(68%) 
 
128 
(26%) 
 
364 
(74%) 
 
170 
(27%) 
 
453 
(73%) 
 
Nixon- 1969 
(Burger) 
 
38 
(49%) 
 
39 
(51%) 
 
146 
(46%) 
 
168 
(54%) 
 
184 
(47%) 
 
207 
(53%) 
 
Reagan-
1981 
(O’Connor) 
 
30 
(45%) 
 
36 
(55%) 
 
158 
(53%) 
 
142 
(47%) 
 
188 
(51%) 
 
178 
(49%) 
 
Clinton-
1993 
(Ginsburg) 
 
11 
(55%) 
 
9 
(45%) 
 
99 
(54%) 
 
84 
(46%) 
 
110 
(54%) 
 
93 
(46%) 
 
Bush-2005 
(Roberts) 
 
2 
(50%) 
 
2 
(50%) 
 
37 
(62%) 
 
23 
(38%) 
 
39 
(61%) 
 
25 
(39%) 
 
Obama-2009 
(Sotomayor) 
 
10 
(67%) 
 
5 
(33%) 
 
66 
(56%) 
 
52 
(44%) 
 
76 
(57%) 
 
57 
(43%) 
 
112 Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors. 
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Although it may be tempting by some to attribute the evolution of 
a pro-business Supreme Court solely to something unique about the 
Roberts Court, the evidence suggests that would be an oversimplifi-
cation. An underlying cause of the shift is best explained by nature of 
regime politics over time. And thus, the key lesson here is to understand 
that while the Roberts Court has, in the aggregate, trended in a pro-
business direction, it is not true that the Court’s pro-business orienta-
tion is a dramatic departure from its predecessors. This fact is amplified 
when we analyze the Court’s decisions using theoretically motivated 
historical periods as our unit of analysis instead of the chief justice, as 
Table 4 demonstrates. It is almost certainly the case that justices’ views 
over time came to reflect the growing political consensus among the 
presidents who appointed them over time. 
Although we think the Roberts Court’s cases involving economic 
and labor issues can largely be explained by political developments, in 
the previous section we noted while the American regime became more 
conservative as a result of the 1968 and 1980 elections, the period has 
also been characterized by divided government as well as ideological 
and partisan polarization. In Table 5 we analyze decisions in economic 
and union cases in which the Court was divided 5–4. 
Table 5. Direction of decisions in 5–4 cases from the Vinson 
Court to the Roberts Court 
CHIEF 
JUSTICE 
UNION 
ACTIVITY 
ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 
COMBINED 
TOTAL 
 conserv
ative 
liberal conserv
ative 
liberal conserv
ative 
liberal 
Vinson 
Court 
2 
(50%) 
2 
(50%) 
93 
(41%) 
132 
(59%) 
95 
(41%) 
134 
(59%) 
 
Warren 
Court 
 
3 
(38%) 
 
5 
(63%) 
 
134 
(27%) 
 
355 
(73%) 
 
137 
(28%) 
 
360 
(74%) 
 
Burger 
Court 
 
15 
(63%) 
 
9 
(38%) 
 
28 
(54%) 
 
23 
(44%) 
 
43 
(66%) 
 
32 
(34%) 
 
Rehnquist 
Court 
 
6 
(55%) 
 
5 
(46%) 
 
28 
(70%) 
 
12 
(30%) 
 
34 
(67%) 
 
17 
(33%) 
 
Roberts 
Court 
 
4 
(100%) 
 
0 
(37%) 
 
15 
(83%) 
 
3 
(17%) 
 
19 
(86%) 
 
3 
(14%) 
While fifty-nine and seventy-four percent of the 5–4 decisions in the 
Vinson and Warren Courts, respectively were in the liberal direction, 
sixty-six and sixty-seven percent of 5–4 decisions in the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, respectively, were in the conservative direction. And 
eighty-six percent of the 5–4 decisions in the Roberts Court were in the 
conservative direction. This suggests that while the Court’s shift in a 
pro-business direction over time mirrors the influence of conservatism 
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over the past four or five decades, the Court is also divided in a way 
that reflects broader political divisions in the country. 
Conclusion 
We agree with conclusions that in general, the Roberts Court seems 
to be more “pro-business” than previous Courts. At an aggregate level, 
our empirical analysis is consistent with that of Epstein, Landes, and 
Posner.113 Whether one analyzes cases based on business entities as liti-
gants or based on the issue areas of economic and union activity, the 
Roberts Court has been more likely to rule in a direction that favors 
business interests than previous courts. However, we also agree that the 
aggregation of outcomes and votes cannot tell the complete story. We 
agree with legal scholars that not all legal doctrine is created equally, 
and the outcomes and votes of the justices cannot explain whether the 
Court’s holdings in particular doctrinal areas will have favorable effects 
for business interests in the future. Both types of analyses are essential 
for a fuller understanding of the Court’s decisions involving economic 
issues, or any other issues for that matter. 
We also argue that it is a mistake to use the chief justice as the 
unit of analysis for understanding legal change on the Court. Because 
legal change is often a function of political change and regime politics, 
it makes more sense to analyze the Court’s decisions across and within 
political regimes and political time. Our analysis indicates that as the 
New Right Regime emerged, the Court gradually adopted a more 
business-friendly position—and that trend began long before John 
Roberts was appointed Chief Justice. Moreover, although the Court 
gradually embraced regime values regarding economic policy over time, 
it also reflects the divisions and polarization that characterized the U.S. 
federal government during the same time period. 
 
113. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 1469–72 (summarizing Epstein, 
Landes, and Posner’s findings concerning the Roberts Court’s favorability 
to business). 
